This paper focuses on the relation between REIT fee structure and two key Management Company decisions, namely debt issuance and investment. Using a sample of Italian REITs during the period between 2006 and 2009, we find that fees paid on gross asset value (GAV) create an incentive for the Management Company to expand their asset base by taking on proportionally more debt than fees paid on net asset value NAV and greater leverage than if the fees were paid on the market value of the fund, as implied by the fact that the effect on leverage is greatest when the fund redemption date is far ahead and the fund is younger. On balance, our results demonstrate that REITs fee structure influences Management Company financial decisions and trading policy.
Introduction
This paper focuses on the relation between REIT fee structure and two key Management Company decisions, namely debt issuance and investment. REITs management company compensation takes typically the form of management fees and performance fees. 1 Management fees are generally paid once a year (sometimes twice) as a fixed percentage of NAV (net asset value under management) or GAV (gross asset value under management or, equivalently, the property-level cash-flows of the asset). Performance fees are generally composed of periodic fees (usually paid once a year) and final fees (paid at the end of the fund life), and they are based on agreed measures of performance, generally expressed as a function of the fund internal rate of return or market value 2 . In this paper, our aim is to establish whether debt issuance and investment depend on the relative importance of these two types of fees in the overall key Management Company compensation scheme and the 1 To be more precise, REITs pay other types of expenses to maintain their operations (e.g., depositary fees, publication fees and legal fees). However, we do not consider these fees in our model. 2 REIT prospectuses often indicate an explicit target hurdle rate.
effect this has on shareholders' value. It should be noticed that, in practice, in some cases performance fees are paid on NAV or GAV. In this circumstance, there is not a significant difference between management and performance fees. For this reason, in this paper we restrict the definition of performance fees only to fees paid on the fund market value.
REITs fund market value should be in line with their NAV (net asset value) as the latter represents the fundamental value of the fund. But it is well known that, empirically, this is often not the case in that REITs typically trade at a discount on their NAV. In the extant literature, REIT performance is explained by momentum, size, turnover and analyst coverage (Chui et al. 2003) , diversification and liquidity effects (Capozza and Seguin 1999) and governance factors such as external advisory contracts (Capozza and Seguin 2000) , insider
ownership (Capozza and Seguin 2003; Han 2006) , institutional ownership (Wang et al. 1995) , and independent boards (Ghosh and Sirmans 2003; Feng et al. 2005) . The closely related theme of REIT discount to NAV is often linked to size, leverage, concentration (both in terms of sector and location), overhead expenses (Capozza and Lee 1995) , presence of outside directors (Friday and Sirmans 1998) , ownership structure (Friday and Sirmans 1998; Capozza and Seguin 2003) , entrepreneurial ability of the fund management (Adams and Venmore-Rowland 1990) , and investor overreaction (Barkham and Ward 1999) . Another line of attach in explaining REIT discount is to consider agency costs, which occur when managers have an incentive to pursue their own interests instead of shareholder interests (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976) . The separation of ownership (REIT shareholders) and control (Management Company) leads to agency problems. Sagalyn (1996) argues that a misalignment of incentives exists for REITs and, in particular, for REITs that are managed externally (i.e., managed by advisors).
We can divide research on agency problems into two broad classes. On the one hand, there are studies that investigate the optimal compensation scheme (Cannon and Vogt 1995; Sun 2010) . Solt and Miller (1985) show that fees and financial performance are positively related and therefore financial performance is at least partially endogenous with respect to managerial action, implying that the increasing fee structure the authors observe over time is consistent with the best interest of shareholders. A positive relationship between fees and performance is confirmed by Feng et al. (2007) . On the other hand, a number of studies examine the effect of fee structure on the strategies implemented by the Management
Company. Jenkins (1980) finds that more than one half of the REITs in their sample used some form of incentive compensation and incentive fees make leverage and risk-taking more advantageous to the managers and advisors than to shareholders. Finnerty and Park (1991) and Fletcher and Diskin (1994) also study the interrelations between fee structure and debt policy. These authors show that compensating Management Companies on total asset value is an incentive for them to expand the fund asset base through the use of leverage. In particular, Finnerty and Park (1991) show that REITs with this type of incentive fees are larger than other REITs, pay higher dividends, and have greater leverage, more liquidity, more convertible debt, higher asset growth rates, and larger betas. Capozza and Seguin (2000) underline that externally managed REITs dramatically underperform their internally managed competitors and underperformance derives primarily from their use (or abuse) of leverage and debt, in that the former issue debt with promised rates that exceed both the yield paid by the latter and the current yield on projects undertaken with the loaned funds. The authors argue that such suboptimal behavior by managers can be explained by examining the base of their compensation. widespread in the REIT sector. We are, however, able to test it indirectly by breaking up the differential effect on managerial incentives of performance fees and fees paid on GAV as the sum of, on the one hand, the differential effect of performance fees and management fees paid on NAV and, on the other hand, the differential effect of management fees paid on NAV and management fees paid on GAV. The first component is not observable since performance fees are rarely used, but its strength should be inversely proportional to the residual life of the fund and proportional to its age, since NAV will tend to come closer to the market value as the fund unwinding approaches and experts in charge of assessing NAV develop more familiarity with the fund investments. We exploit this fact to identify its impact on financing and investment decisions.
We find that (management) fees paid on GAV create an incentive for the Management
Company to expand their asset base by taking on proportionally more debt than fees paid on NAV. This suggests that fees paid on GAV lead Management Companies to suboptimal (from a shareholder's perspective) financing and investment decisions, bent on maximizing fees rather than on generating shareholders' value. To the extent that NAV overestimates market value, which tends to happen especially when the fund redemption is far ahead in the future and the fund is relatively young, the effect of incentives created by fees paid on GAV is even more sub-optimal when compared to those generated by fees paid on market value. This is borne out in our data in that Management Companies in receipt of fees paid on GAV not only take on proportionally more debt than those compensated with fees paid on NAV but tend to do so to a greater extent when the fund redemption date is far ahead and the fund is younger. On balance, our results demonstrate that REITs fee structure influences Management Company financial decisions and trading policy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical model describing the impact of fee structure REIT managerial choices. Section 3 and 4 describe the dataset and empirical setup used to test the theoretical model. Section 5 states a set of testable hypotheses and presents the results of our empirical analysis. Section 6 draws the conclusions.
The model
We assume the REIT fund market value to be a function, v , of Management Company investments, + ∈ R I 4 , and debt,
be twice continuously differentiable strictly concave on the non-negative orthant with an interior maximum. For simplicity, we can specify v as an additively separable function,
Since v is strictly concave, the first-order necessary and sufficient conditions (FOCs) for its maximization are, 
. 4 The model can also be expressed in terms of net investments. In that case, Case 1 -The Management Company receives only a performance fee,
Since m is strictly concave, the first-order conditions for its maximization are necessary and sufficient, ( )
[4]
As both members of the previous two expressions can be divided by π without affecting the results, the FOCs of this problem are identical to those in system [2] and the following observation is straightforward. Thus, in case 1,
10 Case 2 -The Management Company receives a performance fee,
, and a management fee on NAV,
Since m is a sum of a strictly concave function and a concave function, it is strictly concave.
Thus, the first-order conditions for its maximization are necessary and sufficient, [8]
Since m is strictly concave, 0 < II m . Thus, the sign of
agrees with the sign of ( ) , the management fee is irrelevant for the investment policy. Moreover, the second equation in [8] implies that the level of debt is at its optimal value. It is important to note that this conclusion hinges on the assumption that ( ) , v I D is separable and strictly concave in both its arguments, so that it can be strictly concave in D. This requires that any over-investment can be financed using internally generated funds without hitting the budget constraint. While not fully realistic, this is an assumption we maintain as it considerably simplifies the analytical derivation of managerial response to the fee structure.
( )
, and a management fee on GAV,
Also in this case m is strictly concave. Thus, the first-order necessary and sufficient conditions for maximizing m are ( ) [10]
The optimal choice of [11]
Solving the previous system for [12]
As in the previous case, the sign of However, it follows from the first equations in the systems described by [8] and [12] that the level of investment is not affected by the choice of the base for the management fee (GAV or NAV), as long as the performance fee (on the fund market value) is sufficiently large compared to the management fee.
To sum up, the previous analysis shows that only performance fees optimally reduce agency conflicts, by ensuring that maximizing shareholder wealth by means of optimal investment and financing decisions is the only way for the Management Company to maximize the fee amount it receives. In contrast, management fees may lead Management Companies to opportunistic behavior. The model suggests that the Management Company assumes more debts when management fees are paid on GAV (rather than NAV), and tends to choose the same suboptimal level of investment in case of a management fee paid either on GAV or NAV.
Empirical setup
To test our theoretical model empirically, we use a panel dataset of Italian REITs and a regression model of the following general form:
where it y is the response variable for the unit i at time t , α is a scalar, β is a Effects (RE) model. The BE estimator exploits the between dimension of the data (differences between individuals). The BE estimator is consistent if the covariates are strictly exogenous and uncorrelated with the unobservable time-constant unit effects. The FE estimator uses the within dimension of the data (differences within individuals). The FE estimator requires the covariates to be strictly exogenous, but does not impose any restriction on the correlation between explanatory variables and unobservable time-constant unit effects.
The FE model has the attraction of needing weaker assumptions than those required by other estimators. The OLS estimator exploits both the within and the between dimensions of the data, but not efficiently. Consistency of this estimator requires the explanatory variables to be uncorrelated with the unobservable time-constant unit effects and the idiosyncratic error term.
The RE estimator uses both the within and the between dimensions of the data efficiently.
Consistency requires all the covariates to be strictly exogenous and independent of the unobserved time-constant unit effects, a condition that rarely holds in economic applications.
Data and variables description
We base our empirical analysis on a sample composed of all the 22 Italian listed REITs. We collected all the data from the compulsory half-year reports that the funds published in the 4- it duration is the number of years that, at inception, the fund is set to last.
Empirical results
It is worth emphasizing that not all the Propositions presented in section 2 can be tested directly using our sample of REITs. Especially Proposition 1 and 2 cannot be directly tested because all the REITs in our sample exhibit a compensation structure largely based on management fees only. We can however indirectly identify the managerial incentive distortion brought about by the absence of performance fees set as a proportion of the fund market value by noting that the latter differs from NAV the most for young funds, in that the expert assessors of NAV have had less time to get to know the fund and its portfolio of properties, and for funds that have a long residual life, since at redemption market value and NAV must converge, and therefore NAV assessors will try harder to align their valuation to the market as the time to unwind the fund approaches. We thus consider the following estimator is the only one that is consistent. Given the high explanatory power of the model estimated using RE, we believe that we can rule out that omitted variables exert a large influence. Therefore, while we cannot rule out correlation between individual effects and some of the covariates, it seems reasonable to deem such possible influences not strong enough to invalidate inferences based on the RE estimates. According to the latter, all effects are statistically very significant 8 .
The third Proposition, taken in isolation, may be tested more easily. It implies two more specific hypotheses that can be directly tested. The first of such hypothesis is the following:
Hypothesis 1 (H1) -If management fees are paid on GAV rather than on NAV, the REIT is more indebted.
As a first naïve check of whether H1 holds, figure 1 plots the debt-to-GAV ratio (Peng 2008 ).
The figure is divided in three panels. In the central panel, the time series pbservations of each increases. An alternative story is that since REITs are characterized by a high debt capacity, they benefited from the cut in interest rates as part of the expansive monetary policy pursued by the European Central Bank to counteract the financial crisis.
[ Figure 1 ]
As a more formal test of H1, we propose a panel regression analysis on the model
[16]
In this model, Management Companies tend to assume more debts when management fees are paid on GAV than they do when these fees are paid on NAV. This effect is very statistically significant 9 . As expected, the FE estimator has the largest within R-squared, while the BE and the OLS estimators maximize the between and the overall R-squared respectively. Wald test statistics (not reported) are calculated for all models to test for the hypothesis that all coefficients in the model except the intercept are equal to zero. All tests lead to rejecting the hypothesis that the conditional mean of the response variable is constant and independent of covariates.
[ Table 2 ]
The second hypothesis we wish to test posits that:
Hypothesis 2 (H2) -The level of investments is not related to the base on which the management fee is paid (GAV or NAV).
In this case, figure 2 plots the net investment-to-NAV ratio. As expected, the distinction between GAV-fee-based funds and NAV-fee-based funds seems to play no role for decreases. An alternative story is that investments decrease as a consequence of the financial crisis.
[ Figure 2 ]
The regression model to test H2 is
[17] 
